Abstract: In this talk I describe neuroimaging findings that give us a glimp of what goes on in the brain during highly private experiences such as self-reflection. Although neuroimaging methods are limited in nature and cannot give us a complete account of subjective phenomena, they can help in elucidating disorders of subjective experience as in the case of verbal hallucinations (or “hearing voices”) in schizophrenia. I will argue that linking phenomenal experience to cognitive processing and to the corresponding neural substrate will open new vistas on the workings of the human mind/brain.

Abstract: To capture how intense is the interest for neuroimaging techniques outside of biology, it is useful to contrast it with the immediate past, and recall that more than a disinterest, it was a frank opposition to biological observations which characterized social sciences in the matters of culture and human social behavior. This reminder makes all the more striking the enthusiastic embrace of brain imaging techniques in the recent years – what caused this shift of attitude in social sciences, and the wider society? We will suggest that as series of important methodological changes were at work since the 1970s, which make of the popularity of neuroimaging less as a revolution than an evolution. Ironically, this is probably a more circumstantial aspect which accelerated the process and is responsible for a degree of fascination for neuroimaging by the social scientists, the wider public, and the biologists themselves.

Abstract: Neuroimaging experiments offer a window through which to examine the brain and the way it supports cognition in its myriad forms. However, individual experiments are typically underpowered and focused on fairly narrow scientific questions. In this workshop we will discuss several methods for extracting information from large collections of neuroimaging results, including cross-domain function-to-structure mapping and functional connectivity analysis. Using these methods allows us to identify and map the overlapping functional networks responsible for cognition, and shed light on the overall functional architecture of the brain. This general approach takes the standard view that what neuroimaging experiments do is shed light on brain organization. But looked at another way, these same experiments allow us to use the brain as a lens through which to view the organization of cognition itself. That is, the brain can be viewed as a machine evolved for differentially responding to features of its environment, including features of psychology experiments. We may think this set of experiments manipulates cognitive load, and that set manipulates spatial attention, but does the brain agree? Using brain activation as our guide, we may be able to shed new light on what various experiments have in common, and what differentiates them from one another. Thus, in this workshop we will also discuss various methods for reinterpreting neuroimaging experiments to help us do such things as (re-)evaluate and improve our cognitive ontology.

Mandatory preparation literature:
Anderson, M.L. (2010). Neural reuse: A fundamental organizational principle of the brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33(4): 245–313. (PDF)
Yarkoni, T., Poldrack, R. A., Van Essen, D. C., & Wager, T. D. (2010). Cognitive neuroscience 2.0: building a cumulative science of human brain function. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14, 489-496. (PDF)

Abstract: We tend to treat one another as accountable persons. Part and parcel of this treatment is the exchange of reasons: We constantly explain and justify to ourselves and others why we do what we do, and for what reasons. Yet, some neuroscientists as well as behavioral scientists claim that these justifications and explanations are made up ‘after the fact,’ moreover, that they do not correspond with what actually explains our behavior. What actually explains our actions are brainstates, states we are not necessarily aware of (and that we, in the future, might be able to read out of our brains). Therefore, we have to radically change our views and practices involving the assumption that we possess free (conscious) will and are accountable. In this workshop we discuss the neuroscientists inclination to phrase their findings as a threat to free will and accountability. We propose that discussing these findings in terms of the role that reasons play in our everyday explanations and justifications of our actions is much more interesting.

Mandatory preparation literature:
Sie, M., Wouters, A. (2009), The BCN Challenge to Compatibilist Free Will and Personal Responsibility. in Neuroethics 3: 121-133.
Bor, D. (2010). The Mechanics of Mind Reading. Recent advances in brainscanning allow unprecedented access to our thoughts and mental states. Scientific American Mind, July/August 2010. (link)
Soon, C.S., Brass, M., Heinze, H.-J. & Haynes, J.-D. (2008). Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain. Nature Neuroscience 11: 543-545.

Abstract: Lourens Waldorp offers an introduction to fMRI experimenting, from its initial phase until the end, shedding light on all steps involved and some important methodological issues. This workshop is meant for academics of all disciplines who are interested to learn more about fMRI research.

There are no reading requirements for this workshop.